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ELIGIBILITY (SIX-YEAR) RULE
Introduction
PROF. KATSORIS: The next topic to be discussed is the eligibility
rule-the so called six-year rule.65 First, allow me to provide a little

background on it. When the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA") first drew up the Uniform Code, a great deal of
comment was made that we didn't want to have a lot of stale claims in
arbitration for a variety of reasons. SICA inserted the so-called sixyear eligibility rule, not with any mischief in mind, but really as a matter of convenience. The clear intent was not to create a new statute of
limitations, nor was it intended to prevent somebody from asserting
their remedy elsewhere, absent the six-year rule.
Well, after McMahon,66 after the 1986 Tax Reform Act,67 and after
Black Monday, 68 this six-year rule seems to have turned self-regulatory organization arbitration on its ear. To discuss this issue, we have
two distinguished panelists. We will start with Mr. Seth Lipner.
Panelists
MR. LIPNER: Starting the same way I start my discussions with
my clients when I talk about arbitration as a method of dispute resolution-I'll be kind of frank about it because I'm quoting and you'll
pardon me if some of the language is a little bit harsh-I tell them
arbitration [stinks], but it [stinks] a lot less than going to court. And I
really believe that.
PROF. KATSORIS: That comment will be edited for the Fordham
Law Review.
MR. LIPNER: It was a quote. But I still think it's a lot better than
going to court, though there may be some cases around the periphery,
some large cases that do work better in court. But I think, in general,
arbitration is a good system, and I like the idea that the banking system, at least for small claims, or what appear to be relatively modest
claims, is going to start to look at it.
But I found it interesting to compare, just on an unknowledgeable
ear, what Mr. Cooney was saying when trying to persuade consumer
65. NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 603,

§ 4(a), at 9.

2603; Uniform Code, supra note 14,

66. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
67. The 1986 Tax Reform Act made many tax-driven limited partnerships less at-

tractive. See Deborah A. Demott, Rollups of Limited Partnerships: Questions of Regulation and Fairness,70 Wash. U. L.Q. 617, 624 (1992).
68. "On 'Black Monday,' October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones industrial average
plummeted 508 points-more than twenty percent-to 1738.74, becoming the largest
single-day drop in that average in the history of the stock market, even exceeding the
crash of October 29, 1929." Scott T. Pratt & Elizabeth A. Kendrick, Errorsand Omis-

sions Coverage for Securities Brokers, 61 Def. Couns. J. 393, 393 (1994).
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advocates and groups to join in the arbitration system, and Mr. Stone
and Mr. Krebsbach in their defense of arbitration, and I find it sounding much more hollow.
I like the notion that arbitration is an expeditious method of dispute
resolution in which a lot less time is spent on the needless parts of the
litigation system, avoiding the large attorneys' fees that make dispute
resolution so cumbersome in this country.
I would like to introduce Mr. Cooney to the man sitting on his left
from Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch has spent more money in the last
two years litigating arbitration issues and trying to deny customers the
opportunity to arbitrate claims than any other firm that I can think of,
and I'm involved in a lot of that.
A lot of it revolves around this six-year eligibility rule, which is relatively simple on one hand and very complex on the other. The rule
says that for a claimant to be eligible for arbitration, six years must
not have expired from the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim.
The courts in New York have interpreted this to mean that the occurrence or event is the purchase date, that the six years runs without
excuse and without any benefit of any of the tolling provisions that
might accrue on a typical statute of limitations argument, and that the
six years forecloses people not only from arbitrating, but also from
going to court.69

Most people don't realize that when an agreement says all disputes
will be resolved by arbitration, and then there is a six-year limit on the
filing of arbitrations, if you're past the six years, there is no remedy
whatsoever. You cannot go to court. The New York Court of Appeals said so in 1953 in the River Brand Rice70 case, and I haven't seen
anything that would change my mind about that, at least in New York.
We do, however, seem to litigate around the country many issues
concerning this eligibility rule, including who decides it, whether it's a
matter for the arbitrators or the courts, 7 ' whether it can be tolled or
extended, and what other occurrences or events might exist.
We argue about new language, about post-purchase claims and the
right to arbitrate those, or the right to go to court if you can't go to
arbitration. These issues are churning around in virtually every court
in this country, both state and federal. When Professor Katsoris says
that the eligibility rule was designed as a matter of convenience and
that it was never designed to extinguish anybody's claim, I can tell you
unequivocally that it is no longer being used as a matter of convenience for the benefit of the SROs. It is being used solely as a sword to
stab into the heart of people who have claims that might be viable
69. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Barnum, 616 N.Y.S.2d 857,
858-59 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
70. River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 110 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y.
1953).
71. See Spencer, supra note 40.
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under state law or federal law when it comes to the tolling of things
like a statute of limitations or questions of accrual or estoppel with
regard to a statute of limitations. Nevertheless, with the eligibility
rule, there are no excuses.
What we have essentially done is taken this rule, inserted it into the
customer agreement by reference, and then closed the door on these
people's legal rights even though they might still be alive under state
law. A little later I'm sure Mr. Peloso is going to tell you why punitive
damages are bad.' He'll argue that the private citizen should not be
able to usurp the power of government and punish or assume the
power to punish. Punishment is purely a governmental function, he
will tell you.
Well, the same is true with regard to eligibility. If the legislatures
have said that there is a certain time limit on claims, and the legislatures and the judiciary for five hundred years have said that statutes of
limitations depend on concepts like accrual and tolling-concepts that
are much more flexible than the eligibility rule ever was-why is it
that these private parties are usurping the power of the legislature and
using this contract provision to close the door absolutely and without
excuse on many, many claims?
Now, it may be that two years down the road when many of the
limited partnership cases are over, or time would have expired even
under state statutes of limitations, that the import or effect of the eligibility rule will be minimized. I tell you, however, that there are still
products being sold by members of this Exchange that they cannot
price-that they cannot with assurance tell you what the products are
worth. There are CMOs73 based on variable rates and tied to daily
LIBOR 74 that are thirty years out there that cannot be priced. Yet six
years from the purchase, your claims are extinguished in arbitration,
and under River Brand Rice you cannot go to court, even though your
investments still have two years to run. It's still out there.
If the New York Stock Exchange and the NASD want to take on
the heavy burden of running a judicial system, part of that burden is to
do so in a fair manner. Mr. Cooney did a good job, I thought, of
telling us how his firm is going to convince 75the public that alternative
dispute resolution is fair and makes sense.
72. See infra pp. 1575-78.
73. Collateralized Mortgage Obligations ("CMOs") are "a type of pay-through
mortgage-backed bond which makes use of two or more classes of securities having
different maturities, interest rates and amortization schedules." William R. Giusti,
Asset-Based FinancingIncludingSecuritization and Acquisition Financing1994, in Asset Securitization, at 335 (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. A44447, 1994).
74. LIBOR, the "London Interbank Offered Rate," is a commonly used interest
rate.
75. See supra pp. 1526-30.
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The eligibility rule, the New York choice-of-law clause, and the
things Ted Eppenstein was talking about in customer agreements today76 tell me that there is a tremendous gulf between the perceptions
of the banking industry and why arbitration is good for it, and the
securities industry and why the particular form of arbitration that they
have chosen is best for it.
MR. MEISTER: I think in this area, as with some of the other subjects we're covering, there is a sense that I get from comments made
earlier today that the arbitration process is supposed to be perfect and
is supposed to supplant judicial systems and years of accumulated
legal and procedural precedent. I don't think anybody seriously
thinks that is true.
I think that the arbitration system works very well. I also think that,
by and large, what we're talking about when we deal with eligibility
disputes are the exceptional cases or the strange ones because of the
facts or because of the amount of money involved.
If you sit in a large brokerage firm and watch cases come in, you see
that they go through the system and are resolved through settlements
or hearings. You cannot, I think, conclude that there is anything seriously wrong with this system. It works awfully well, particularly if you
compare it with what happens in courthouses around the country,
where suits take a lot longer and cost a lot more money to both sides.
The transaction cost of resolving the dispute is what the plaintiff and
the brokerage firm should be looking at: How much does it cost to
resolve this dispute? That cost goes way up, not because the claimants
of the world are getting paid, but because the lawyers who are the
intermediaries in the process are getting too much money and taking
up too much time.
In terms of the six-year rule specifically, let me make one initial
comment: Six years is a long time. It's been seven years since the
Stock Market Crash. While there are products and situations that will
sleep, lay dormant, or hide under the rug for a long period of time, I
believe it is fair to say that most problems either have come to light by
the time six years have passed or, perhaps, ought to lay sleeping.
One of the problems you see if you spend time actually in arbitrations, as I and many of you do, is that when witnesses are talking
about something that happened years and years ago, it can become a
joke. People claim to remember things that they couldn't possibly remember. People have forgotten things that they perhaps knew at one
point in time. They get embarrassed and look guilty because they
can't remember, not because they did something wrong.
I sat in on a New York Stock Exchange hearing in Florida not too
long ago where witnesses were trying to conjure up things that happened in 1986. It was just silly.
76. See supra pp. 1517-20.

1995]

SYMPOSIUM

1537

There is an important societal interest at some point in time in
drawing a bright line and saying, "This is now over. We're not going
to spend time fussing with it anymore." Is that arbitrary? Yes. Is the
point in time where you draw that line going to cause certain people
to be disadvantaged or cause certain people who have been injured
not to be compensated? Absolutely. There is no question about it.
But, by the same token, there is a societal interest in saying we're no
longer going to waste everyone's time arguing over disputes that are
that old.
There has been a great deal of litigation over where you draw and
how you draw that line and whether that judgment is to be made by
arbitrators or the courts. What we are seeing right now, which may be
because of the limited partnership situation, which I think is a major
contributor to the confusion and probably is about run its course, are
situations where a brokerage firm will run into court to try to enjoin
an arbitration. They may choose a situs for that lawsuit that is inconvenient to the plaintiff, and obviously there are strategic reasons for
doing that, and we all know what they are.
You see mass actions filed in, say, Florida, Texas, or some other
state that may be more sympathetic to the claimant's side of the argument, which are simply lawsuits that request, "Judge, please send me
to arbitration." I've seen so many of these cases filed that I was somewhat amused earlier when speakers were saying that they don't want
to go to arbitration, it's terrible, and customers ought not be required
to sign arbitration agreements. We see these cases with two or three
hundred plaintiffs. I have seen one that has a caption eighty-six pages
long, and the only relief they are seeking from the judge is, "Please
send me to arbitration. Send me to arbitration."
Why are they doing that silly thing? Because the six-year eligibility
rule says that the six-year limitation doesn't apply to cases that are
directed to arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction. What
plaintiff's counsel is saying is that even though my claim is seven years
old, if that person with that robe on says to go to arbitration, I can go,
albeit through the back door. I can't go through the front door, but I
can go through the back door. And once I'm in there, I'm in there.
That lawsuit is responded to by a counterclaim from the brokerage
firm to enjoin prosecution of the case based on the six-year rule, and
then the parties go back and forth in whatever court they're in. The
judge will go one way or the other, and one side may or may not take
that up on appeal.
What then can happen, and I think this is a spill over, is that the
defendants say, "If I'm going to court on the six-year eligibility rule, I
might as well try to get additional relief while I'm there. Why don't I
try to knock out punitive damages. If I'm going to spend money, hire
a lawyer and write a brief, let's try to preclude a claim for punitive
damages as well. Let's try to knock out claimant's demand for attor-
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neys' fees." Essentially, because you are already in court, you go
down your laundry list of things that you might as well ask the judge
to do because you never know what relief might be granted.
When all of these other issues are raised in briefs, you wind up with
the whole process, which was supposed to be done in arbitration
under a reasonably simple set of rules, expanding into prolonged court
proceedings. Then you get decisions going each way, people suing in
strange places, and the entire process spinning out of control.
Frankly, I think if we had a bright line, and it was six years from the
purchase, because everybody could figure out what the purchase date
is, you would eliminate some of these problems. You would avoid
thorny questions of tolling and fraudulent concealment, which are legitimate in certain cases but unduly time-consuming to resolve. In
short, you would conclude that it is more prudent to sacrifice those
few isolated cases to create and maintain sensibility in the process.
We would all be quite better off.
In response to claimants' lawyers who object to brokerage firms going into court, one point that should not get lost in the shuffle is that
claimants frequently will name individual brokers as defendants in
these cases. These individual brokers will have lawyers, and those
lawyers will say there is a six-year rule, and that they don't want to go
to an arbitration if they don't have to, even if XYZ brokerage firm is
willing to do that. I don't want to go there. If the same lawyer is
representing the broker and the firm, that lawyer may be looking at a
malpractice lawsuit if he or she doesn't go into court and try to get the
arbitration enjoined.
Brokers are far more aggressive now in protecting, or at least asserting, their rights than they have ever been before. So, you can wind
up with a lot of peripheral litigation that is really unnecessary.
There is another area that we haven't really focused on this morning that I want to touch on briefly. Not every case in arbitration relates to customers and brokerage firms. You have employment cases.
You have brokers who have sold a particular product that a firm
brought out, the product winds up less than successful, the brokers
wind up being sued by customers who are unhappy, and the brokers in
turn sue their former employer, the brokerage firm, and allege that
the firm didn't tell them all they needed to know about the product.
Those claims could very well come in long after the events in issue,
and, once again, you are confronted with the problem of trying to recreate, ten years after the fact, a set of circumstances, documents, and
things of that sort, for which the process was never really designed.
In summary, my view is that we ought to have sharper, clearer lines.
They will be arbitrary to an extent, and certain people will be hurt by
them, or at least disadvantaged by them, but you need to have those
limitations because, otherwise, the dispute resolution process gets
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bogged down with all of this excess baggage, and the end result is that
nobody benefits.
Discussion
PROF. KATSORIS: Thank you. Before we open it up for questioning, I would like to make a couple of comments.
I would like to make one point, Seth, regarding the court decisions
in New York that you referred to concerning the six-year rule. It was
our six-year rule at SICA, and we sought to interpret our rule clearly
and visibly, and with all due respect to the courts in New York, we felt
we had a right to interpret our own rule. SICA, therefore, amended
7
section four of the Uniform Code to clarify any ambiguities.
It now basically provides that the decision on eligibility is to be
made by the Directors of Arbitration78 because SICA has confidence
in their abilities. This was done as a compromise solution because
some of us at SICA felt such decisions should be made by the arbitrators themselves.
SICA then made another clear statement: If eligibility was found, it
automatically stays in arbitration. On the other hand, if eligibility was
not found, it could go anywhere else it would otherwise go, such as to
court. In addition, SICA said that the rule was not a bar79to further
action. That's where we are as far as SICA is concerned.
I might add that the American Arbitration Association does not
have a six-year eligibility rule. Moreover, about a year and a half ago,
at a SICA meeting that I was chairing, we were discussing this issue of
the six-year rule. Off the top of my head, I flippantly remarked, "Why
are we arguing about this so much?" and suggested that we just eliminate the six-year rule altogether. Lo and behold, a very good friend of
mine, Bill Fitzpatrick,80 who is extraordinarily knowledgeable in this
area, but who almost always disagrees with me on such matters, said,
"Maybe that's not such a bad idea." Everybody else at that meeting
was so shocked that Bill and I had agreed on this issue that they decided to table further discussion until the next scheduled SICA
meeting.
Well, something happened between that meeting and the following
one because we're still dealing with the problem. I would like to put
eliminating this six-year rule back on the table, because it will come
77. See Uniform Code, supra note 14, § 4(b)-(c), at 9.
78. Traditionally this has been, and is, the practice at the New York Stock
Exchange.

79. To date, no SRO has adopted this amendment to the Uniform Code. The
NASD filing of a similar, expanded version of the amendment was withdrawn at the

request of the SEC after receiving negative comments. The eligibility rule is again
under consideration by SICA.

80. William Fitzpatrick was then General Counsel to the Securities Industry Association and its representative at the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration.
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up again before SICA. It was SICA's rule, and we put it in for convenience. I've heard pros and cons from both the industry's and the
public's point of view. Each side apparently thinks that the rule gives
them a tactical advantage, but overall I think the problem is not worth
it. I would like to put the issue of its elimination back in play.
MR. CELLA: Mr. Meister, understanding the virtue of simplicity
in the methodology by which the industry would apply the six-year
eligibility rule, I would like to know what your view is with regard to
this two-part question:
First, given the nature of the financial products developed by the
industry and marketed by them nationally, many of which are very
confusing and difficult to understand even by the representatives who
sell them, shouldn't there be some consideration to provide some elasticity in the six-year eligibility rule to permit claims to be brought
from the time of discovery of what may well, by intent or neglect, have
been concealed from the investors?
And secondly, section twenty-two 81 currently provides that the arbitrators are empowered to interpret and determine the applicability of
all of the provisions of the Code. In that regard, once a submission
agreement is executed by the parties, isn't jurisdiction exclusively for
the panel of arbitrators to determine whether any claim by a public
investor can indeed be a proper claim under the eligibility rule?
MR. MEISTER: The problem with the discovery rule is that you
wind up spending a great deal of time arguing over when something
was or should have been discovered, and in most situations that I've
seen concerning when people discovered things, you get into a very
complicated set of factual considerations.
In a perfect world, if everyone told the truth and everyone's recollection were as good as it ought to be, that might work. As a practical
matter, it is very difficult to operate on that basis, and you wind up
having essentially another subsidiary trial within a trial, which you do
sometimes in court where you have a discovery provision for a statute
of limitations.
In terms of the section twenty-two point, and this was touched on
before, the question remains who decides eligibility and whether
that's something that the Director of Arbitration should do as opposed to the arbitrators, and then, what should happen with that decision once it's made. I think that decision is best made by the
Directors of Arbitration because they have a better feel for all of the
things that come into play. Particularly if you have a bright line rule
so you don't get into questions of tolling and discovery, that shouldn't
be as complicated a problem for them to handle.
81. Uniform Code, supra note 14, § 22, at 18-19; see NYSE Rules, supra note 14,
Rule 621, 2621.
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I don't think it should be for the arbitrators. It is designed as a
protection, and, frankly, I think that's a protection worth maintaining.
The arbitrators can look at statute of limitations questions and decide
them as they feel appropriate. Whether it's six years or whatever
length of time the SROs choose for it, that is a point at which I don't
think it should go to the arbitrators. I think this is an administrativetype function, and if you make it clearer exactly what the six years are
supposed to relate to, then you probably eliminate some of those
problems.
MR. LIPNER: But what do you tell the investor who says, as I
heard a man who was pro se but quite articulate tell Judge Solomon in
one of these court proceedings about the six-year rule, "They told me
when I made this investment that it would be nine or ten years until
we know the performance and the outcome, and now it's nine or ten
years, and I know it didn't perform the way it was supposed to perform. I want to bring an arbitration. I want some right to some adjudication of whether I was wronged." The answer has to come back
from the court, "Sorry, it's six years from the purchase date. You lose.
There are no excuses, and there is no tolling."
When we think about the utility of a bright line rule, there is great
utility to having no rule. When we talk about how this bright line rule
operates and the few people who might be forced to give up their
claims in terms of the greater good of having a bright line rule, Mr.
Meister, your firm was required to waive that rule in the context of
the global settlement of the limited partnership cases.
Now, the governmental agencies that entered into that agreement
with your firm were willing to say that they can't be held for punitive
damages and that they can't be held for attorneys' fees in the context
of this, but this is the one thing that you were required to give up.
This isn't just a few investors or a few claims being lost for the greater
good. This is the proverbial baby being thrown out with the bath
water.
MR. MEISTER: Well, I don't want to get into a discussion of the
particular agreement. I think things that are agreed to, as opposed to
required, are a matter of judgment.
I do not subscribe to the view that you have articulated as being the
law of New York-that if something is ineligible for arbitration, it
cannot be brought in court. My view would be that if you are not
eligible to go into arbitration, then you can take your shot in court.
So, I don't have a problem with somebody coming up and saying it
was going to be nine years before this investment's result came to
fruition.
I would suggest, though, that if one looks at all sorts of malpractice
questions, whether they are medical or legal, and if you look at the
very strict statutes of limitation that protect lawyers, for example, who
may have malpracticed, I think this rule is very generous by compari-
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son. People have far more time and availability to sue their stockbrokers than they do to sue their doctors or their lawyers.
MR. EPPENSTEIN: Mr. Meister, I find it somewhat ironic that as
the representative for Prudential, you're here today telling us that it's
the claimant's attorneys who are taking up the time and the expense
in the system.
As I recall, your firm waived the statute of limitations in setting up
this settlement program that you have, right? And I'm wondering
whether you would be willing to set up a settlement program for the
rest of the cases that are brought against your firm. That would certainly shorten the time and expense in the system, and you wouldn't
have to worry about attorneys' fees. People could just put in their
claims, and you would have someone looking over the system as you
agreed to.
And also why not give the customer, from what you're saying, the
right to choose to go to court? Why do you give them an arbitration
agreement in the first place unless that's where you want them to go,
because, as you know, all customers can take your firm to arbitration
without an arbitration agreement?
MR. MEISTER: I'll try to be very brief. Again, I'm not going to
get into the details of our resolution of matters with the SEC. I think
that if one wants to, one can say lots of things about contingency fee
agreements and all sorts of other things that I think disadvantage customers far more than disreputable stock brokers.
My point is simply this: The vast number of people that I see coming through the door in arbitration are claimants who do not have predispute arbitration agreements. They are there because they want to
go to arbitration, or the lawyer whom they have retained has decided,
notwithstanding the fact that he could go to court, that he wants to be
in arbitration.
I think that is what I see more often than not. I did not say it was
only the claimants' lawyers who were running into court in terms of
the six-year eligibility rule. I think what happens is both sides are
going into court, and they have to be criticized for it.
MR. STONE: Mr. Chairman, I just want to point to two things.
The first is one of protocol. The purpose of this Symposium, I
thought, was to discuss issues and thresh out those issues, not a particular problem that a firm or client may be having at this present moment, although I would opt to say to Ted, if he's willing to waive
punitive damages and attorneys' fees, we can always talk about the
six-year eligibility rule, if that's of interest. But I really do want to try
to keep this in that sort of vein, and I would hope that that is the
purpose of this Symposium.
PROF. KATSORIS: I don't think we should get into confidential
agreements or things of that nature. I agree with that. Let's just keep
it on the scholarly level of exchanging ideas. I don't want to start
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down the path where we get personal with each other and start pointing fingers. I say that generally to everybody.
MR. PAGE: I would second that. I don't think we accomplish anything by casting aspersions. We all probably live in glass houses to
some extent.
My objection is to what Ken said. I agree, I guess, philosophically,
that there may be a societal good in drawing a bright line, but I don't
think that's our role. I think that's the role of the fifty legislative bodies and legislatures around this country. To the extent we have any
right to draw the bright line, it would be on access to the arbitration
process.
I guess the problem that I have with what is happening in so much
of the litigation with the six-year rule, as I have read McMahon and
the Commission's approval of SRO rules, is that there would be nothing in the arbitration process that would be used to limit or extend
applicable statutes of limitation.
And when you have a rule that has been argued by certain members
of the industry, and interpreted by some courts to foreclose the right
to go to court, I think then you have a problem because the industry
said to the Commission, and to the Supreme Court, "We're not going
to use it that way."
Personally, it seems to me that, in agreement with Gus, maybe the
six-year rule is not viable, and there is no need for it. If arbitration is
good for the short term cases, it ought to be good for all cases.
Regardless, it needs to be clear that it is not being used, or it is not
intended to be used, as a statute of limitations. I don't think that we
can put ourselves, or the industry could put itself, or the SROs could
put themselves, in the position of usurping the power of legislatures in
adopting or trying to override the statute of limitations that is applicable in the respective states.
MR. PELOSO: Maybe I look at this too simply, but I've never understood why the arbitration tribunals didn't simply adopt the applicable statute of limitations to the claim asserted.
It seems to me, as Boyd pointed out, that we have the legislatures of
all of the states who have spent a lot of time identifying periods of
limitations within which certain claims should be brought. We have a
whole body of law in each of our states on that particular subject.
There are very good reasons for it, some of which have been identified. Namely, memories fail, claims become stale, and these are good
reasons to have statutes of limitation.
I don't see why the arbitration tribunals, which are charged with
hearing claims that otherwise would have been brought to the courthouse, don't simply have a rule saying: To the extent the statute of
limitations has applicability in the proceeding, the arbitrators can hear
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arguments with respect to that, and they can rule. Why don't they go
with that?
MR. BUCK: The arbitrators can hear the argument on that. If it's
an open trade, the statute of limitations is two years. You simply argue that to the arbitrators. You can't put the Arbitration Director in
the position of having to decide which statute of limitations to apply.
That's too great a burden for the staff person who administers the
claims.
MR. PELOSO: It seems to me that it may or may not be the case if
a claim is twelve years old and is filed. It may be a very easy decision.
If it's more complex, you leave it up to the arbitrators.
But there is a line in some of the types of cases where the Arbitration Director can take a look at the claim, observe that it's obviously
stale, and just refuse to take it. I would amend the rules to prevent
the Directors from exercising their discretion where the case is clear.
If the case is not clear, the decision should go to the arbitrators to
decide after hearing the evidence.
So, many times the application of the statute depends upon the
facts, and I recognize that, Mr. Buck. In that case, the arbitrators can
hear the evidence, and then they render their decision.
MR. BUCK: You almost never get a situation where you have a
unique event and then a finite period of time before the case is
brought. You almost always have a course of dealing over a great
many months or years. It becomes more and more difficult to decide
on what date you should toll the statute.
PROF. KATSORIS: I would like to make a comment for a minute.
I would like to put back on the table the idea of eliminating the sixyear rule altogether. I know at SICA we're very interested in its elimination, at least I am. An idea that Bill Fitzpatrick and I agree on
doesn't come too often and, therefore, doesn't die easily.
We've heard from the parties on both sides on the six-year rule. I
would like to hear something from the Directors of Arbitration who
deal constantly with this problem about what kind of effect it has on
their arbitration programs.
MS. MASUCCI: I would like to inform everyone regarding the philosophy behind the rule, which does predate me. It's my understanding that the eligibility rule was adopted to provide a gatekeeper
concept to eliminate old stale claims, and in fact the six-year time period was chosen because it dovetailed with the SEC books and recordkeeping retention requirement.
You should be aware that there are numerous claims that the SROs
reject before they are even served on respondents because they are
ineligible. The staff review in these cases discloses that on the face of
the statement of claim, the case is clearly older than six years. If it is
determined that the cases served clearly are within six years, or there
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is a dispute regarding what the event or occurrence is that gave rise to
the dispute, then, ultimately, it is the arbitrators, as fact finders, who
must determine what claims are eligible.
The eligibility section has caused an extreme administrative burden
on the SROs. Prior to 1990, if we received twenty motions on eligibility a year, it was a lot. In 1993, this shot to 600 motions, while there
were 470 such motions filed in 1994. These are big numbers that delay
the process. It also does not reflect motions made directly to the
court.
The earlier eligibility is decided, the more it benefits all parties, because it reduces the cost to the parties in the further processing of the
case. In the amendments that Professor Katsoris spoke about earlier,82 we strove to achieve that goal and reduce costs by stating that
the Director would determine eligibility. The statute of limitations
would still apply, so the arbitrators still would have the authority to
dismiss a claim based on the statute of limitations.
Arbitrators could certainly bifurcate the proceeding to hear the
statute of limitations issue beforehand if they thought it was appropriate, and those claims that were determined to be ineligible would still
have a remedy in court.
We believe that process would benefit both sides and would reduce
the cost to both sides. From an administrator's standpoint, everyone
on my staff would say eliminate it and leave the statute of limitations
issues to be determined by the arbitrators. I'm not sure if that is an
acceptable solution. But from an administrative point of view, it
would be much more efficient.
MR. CLEMENTE: I am open to the suggestion, however, that
eliminating the six-year rule may result in more related litigation than
we have already seen and create more of an administrative burden on
the process as a whole. What will happen without the six-year rule?
We will see more and more pre-hearing arguments on the statute of
limitations issue, clearly an issue that does not and should not rest
with the arbitration staff. The determination of factual issues, such as
statute of limitation issues, should not be made by the administrators.
These are factual issues that could very well determine the outcome of
the case; you have to consider factual questions such as discovery and
equitable tolling. On the other hand, determination of the eligibility
issue may be viewed differently, for it determines whether the claim
will be heard in this particular forum.
The intent of the eligibility rule followed the records retention requirement. I believe the rationale back then was that aged disputesstale claims-were too burdensome for the arbitration process (that
was when there were no discovery procedures). Perhaps it was the
belief that arbitrators would give the benefit of the doubt to a cus82. See supra pp. 1539-40.
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tomer's stale claims and want to hear the facts, not legal arguments on
the statute of limitations.
As every attorney knows, the older a case gets, the more documents
disappear and memories fade. One of the biggest complaints you will
hear around this table on the next issue is in regard to the production
of documents. As time goes on, they are harder and harder to find.
Regardless of whether we retain the six-year eligibility rule, at least
under the Civil Procedure Rules in New York, a respondent may seek
83
a stay of arbitration in court on the statute of limitations defense.
So, as I said earlier, elimination of the eligibility rule will not necessarily eliminate the present problem.
The problem that brought this issue to the surface, aside from some
of the products, such as limited partnerships, was the different interpretations of the eligibility rule by the various SROs. The attempt
made by SICA last year with its amendment was a step in the right
direction, a unified interpretation of the eligibility rule, and hopefully
that work will continue.
What the SICA amendment tried to accomplish was to make it
clear that a determination of ineligibility by the Director of Arbitration left open that door to go to court. The original rule was never
intended to foreclose claimants' access to court if their claims were
determined to be ineligible for arbitration. The amendment adopted
last year made that clear. At this point it appears to be the solution
most acceptable to all concerned, at least from what I've heard here
today.
MS. MASUCCI: I would also like to discuss another cost that people don't always focus on. This additional cost siphons resources from
the SRO. Those 470 motions that I spoke about were only administrative motions to the staff. Simultaneously, parties are in court litigating
the eligibility section without even advising us.
In addition, in many of the court actions, the NASD is a named
party. We are in court defending the action or otherwise participating
in the litigation. That is a cost associated with the determination of
eligibility that is draining resources that negatively impact our ability
to administer cases.
PROF. KATSORIS: Thank you. I'll open the floor for comments.
MR. RYDER: I would like to address your proposal, Gus, from my
point of view as an arbitrator.
I think SICA got it right the first time, and that the current rule
proposal is the right one. The language may be up for debate, but I
think the concepts are right. You have the Director decide it so you
have a threshold decision. You have a bright line test. I would make
it six years entirely from the transaction date, and then finally, to
make it fair, if you're closing one door, you allow the claimant to take
83. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7502(b) (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1995).
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his claims elsewhere, to go into court and pursue them. He'll meet his
statute of limitations questions there.
The problem I have with the idea of throwing out the limitations
period entirely, although it probably looks very attractive given the
current state of affairs, is that, ultimately, it hurts the process. The key
to arbitration is the expertise of the arbitrators and their competence
to deal with questions quickly without having to go through a lot of
foundational issues-without having to go through a lot of discovery
and other matters of a procedural nature.
The expertise of an arbitrator is of paramount importance. I say
this from experience. I remember serving as an arbitrator on a case
that was obviously stale-it was six or seven years old. This was back
before people knew about section fifteen in the NASD's Code and
New York Stock Exchange Rule 603, so the question didn't come
up, and it was an industry dispute. I recollect the total absence of
evidence that we had as arbitrators at the end of that proceeding, and
that unfortunately is what is going to happen in arbitration with stale
matters.
You're either going to have to go one way or the other. If you want
to have all the evidence and all the facts and all the documents in
front of the arbitrators so they can exercise their expertise, then
you're going to have to go the way of litigation and have a great deal
of discovery, and with that, a great deal of discovery disputes. Or you
go the other way, leaving the arbitrators without the tools that they
need to exercise their expertise.
I think these kinds of matters are, in a sense, defective. They are
perhaps pursuable in litigation, but to bring them into arbitration
means that the arbitrators can't utilize their expertise. They can't utilize their expertise about documents and industry practice because the
documents aren't available anymore. The industry practice, whatever
it was, was seven, eight, nine, or ten years ago. Who knows what it
was then, and it may have changed.
Finally-regarding the idea of utilizing that experience, that practice, to make a judgment about credibility-as Ken Meister pointed
out, and it really rang a bell, when you listen to people try to testify
about things that happened six, seven, or eight years ago, it is very
difficult to make a credibility judgment because they are reaching as
hard as they can into their memories. If they find nothing, they may
make something up. If they have been prepared beforehand, it may
be that the preparation is what they are remembering now and not the
things that actually happened. Those judgments are very difficult for
arbitrators to make.
84. Respectively, the eligibility section of the NASD and NYSE Arbitration
Rules.
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I don't want to be in that position as an arbitrator. I really rely
upon the expertise that I do have, and it is that comfort that supports
me when I'm working as an arbitrator in feeling that I've done the
best I can.
MR. BECKLEY: I think one element that hasn't been discussed
here this morning that did underlie the original decision to impose an
eligibility rule is the availability of documents.
Between the initial adoption of the eligibility rule and today, there
has been an incredible increase in the document handling efficiency of
the firms, and much of that relates to microfilm and microfiche, particularly computer output microfilm and microfiche. The firms now have
available to them, on an automatic basis-at least they are generated
automatically-documents that twenty years ago they would never
consider keeping in any kind of manageable fashion beyond the sixyear requirement.
For example, I just finished up a case with Prudential where they
were able to produce account documents going back to 1982 and a
new account form that went back to 1979. The critical documents in a
case are almost always available now, and they wouldn't have been
available twenty years ago, with or without the SEC requirement.
The second thing, and we haven't discussed this either, is that every
arbitrator and every judge carries a kind of internal matrix in dealing
with old cases, and you can almost grab half the amount of the award
against the degree of investor remorse. The longer this case has been
allowed to sit before it's brought, the less likely it is that the claimant
is going to recover. So, there is a kind of suspicion factor built into
these cases that inures to the benefit of the industry even without a
six-year limitation.
MR. LIPNER: I have little compassion for Arbitrator Ryder when
he has to deal with these older issues. He has many techniques available to him as a lawyer and arbitrator that can deal with the problems
he's addressed. One being that claims that are old tend not to fly as
well as claims that are young, just on a simple layman's basis. There is
the statute of limitations if you think the person has delayed too long,
and I would encourage arbitrators to apply the statute of limitations
with all of its contours.
There is the matter of cross-examination, something that a judge
often doesn't have, but an arbitrator does have. If you think that the
testimony is based on last week's preparation rather than an independent recollection of events, there is the technique of cross-examination to determine whether that's
so.
And in the end there is the burden of proof. The claimant has the
burden of proof. If the claimant comes forward with a case that's
eight years old, and the answer from the defense when documents are
requested is, "We're only required to retain them for five years. We
don't have them anymore," I suggest no adverse inference would be
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drawn against the firm, and it's up to the claimant to go back and
construct these things. If he can't do it, he hasn't proven his case,
which is his responsibility.
I had an arbitration last summer that was thirteen years old because
it had been through court many, many times, and when I asked for
certain documents the brokerage firm's answer was, "We don't have
them." Ronald Reagan was just elected president at the time. But I
found someone who had those documents, and we were able to introduce them into evidence, and at least I had a chance to prove my case.
The eligibility rule deprives me of even the chance.
It seems to me, in a country with a justice system where we believe
that for every wrong there should be a remedy, the eligibility rule flies
in the face of that simple justice.
PROF. KATSORIS: Any questions of any of the panelists? Okay.
So much for the eligibility rule.

